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ABSTRACT. The sustainability of regional development can be usefully explored through several different
lenses. In situations in which uncertainties and change are key features of the ecological landscape and
social organization, critical factors for sustainability are resilience, the capacity to cope and adapt, and the
conservation of sources of innovation and renewal. However, interventions in social-ecological systems
with the aim of altering resilience immediately confront issues of governance. Who decides what should
be made resilient to what? For whom is resilience to be managed, and for what purpose? In this paper we
draw on the insights from a diverse set of case studies from around the world in which members of the
Resilience Alliance have observed or engaged with sustainability problems at regional scales. Our central
question is: How do certain attributes of governance function in society to enhance the capacity to manage
resilience? Three specific propositions were explored: (1) participation builds trust, and deliberation leads
to the shared understanding needed to mobilize and self-organize; (2) polycentric and multilayered
institutions improve the fit between knowledge, action, and social-ecological contexts in ways that allow
societies to respond more adaptively at appropriate levels; and (3) accountable authorities that also pursue
just distributions of benefits and involuntary risks enhance the adaptive capacity of vulnerable groups and
society as a whole. Some support was found for parts of all three propositions. In exploring the sustainability
of regional social-ecological systems, we are usually faced with a set of ecosystem goods and services that
interact with a collection of users with different technologies, interests, and levels of power. In this situation
in our roles as analysts, facilitators, change agents, or stakeholders, we not only need to ask: The resilience
of what, to what? We must also ask: For whom?
Key Words: governance; resilience; adaptive capacity; institutions; accountability; deliberation;
participation; social justice; polycentric institutions; multilayered institutions
INTRODUCTION
Economic growth, rapid technological change, and
the expansion of scientific knowledge have made
societies more and more confident in their abilities
to “manage” regional environmental change. A
paradigm based on planning for efficiency,
standardizing for easier social control, and reducing
variability has come to pervade bureaucratic
practices. Environmental problems are framed as
technical and administrative challenges devoid of
politics. People need to be informed and persuaded
about the right and wrong uses of ecosystems, and
penalized if they do not follow the right practice.
With good information and technical skills, the
future can be blueprinted.
Over the past few decades, this view of the world
has been challenged again and again by practical
experience (e.g., Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 1999,
Anderies et al. 2004). It now appears that some of
the earlier confidence was misplaced and that key
elements of our understanding of how regional
social-ecological systems evolve were wrong
(Berkes et al. 2003, Ostrom 2003; E. Ostrom and
M. Janssen, unpublished manuscript). Uncertainties
and nonlinearities often arise from both complex
internal feedbacks and from interactions with
structures and processes operating at other scales
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(Gunderson and Holling 2002). Expert knowledge
is incomplete and biased, and participation does not
always make things better (Jasanoff and Wynne
1998, Rayner 2003). There is no optimal best crop,
land management practice, or strategy. Ecosystems
may exist in multiple alternate stable states
(Scheffer and Carpenter 2003). Regional systems
invariably yield a complex mixture of ecosystem
goods and services, each with its own set of
stakeholders (Walker et al. 2002, Lebel 2004).
Taken together, this has meant that attempts by
authorities to tighten control, for example, by
excluding disturbances like fires or floods or by
establishing alternative property rights systems,
have often led, paradoxically, to the creation of
larger, more difficult challenges for society than the
original set of problems (Holling and Meffe 1996).
The alternative to trying to maintain, or transform
to, a system configuration that is very narrowly
defined is to manage resilience. Resilience is a
measure of the amount of change a system can
undergo and still retain the same controls on
structure and function or remain in the same domain
of attraction (Carpenter et al. 2001, Holling 2001,
Walker et al. 2002). To derive useful measures for
a particular social-ecological system, we need to be
specific about both the portfolio of challenges and
the components of the system at risk that are of
interest (Carpenter et al. 2001). In regional systems,
this usually means considering several different
interests and ecosystem goods or services. By
managing resilience, we mean building or eroding
the resilience of particular system configurations.
At the regional scale, feasible management
interventions by authorities or through social
mobilization are, at any particular time, relatively
modest compared to the full suite of factors that
affect ecosystems and the behavior of the actors
involved. Unconventionally, management might
consist of discouraging interventions and allowing
disturbances such as fires to burn or flood waters to
take their course.
Strengthening the capacity of societies to manage
resilience is critical to effectively pursuing
sustainable development. This pursuit is a dynamic
challenge in which it may be desirable, at certain
times, to enhance resilience, e.g., when a system is
in a domain of attraction associated with a desirable
system configuration, and at other times to erode
and help transform a system, e.g., when it is in a
domain associated with an undesirable configuration.
However, who decides when to intervene and
identifies the desirable system configurations? Who
decides what portfolio of challenges the system
should be made resilient to and which are of priority
interest? How are those decisions made? Who
controls implementation? What are the consequences
of alternative courses of action for different
stakeholder groups?
These are fundamentally questions about the
politics of managing resilience and vulnerability. In
this paper, we look at how various institutions,
configurations of actors, and social processes shape
such politics. The central question we address in this
paper is: How do certain attributes of governance
function in society to enhance the capacity to
manage resilience?
GOVERNANCE AND THE CAPACITY TO
MANAGE RESILIENCE
Governance, the structures and processes by which
societies share power, shapes individual and
collective actions (Young 1992). Governance
includes laws, regulations, discursive debates,
negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, elections,
public consultations, protests, and other decision-
making processes. Governance is not the sole
purview of the state through government, but rather
emerges from the interactions of many actors,
including the private sector and not-for-profit
organizations. It can be formally institutionalized
or expressed through subtle norms of interaction or
even more indirectly by influencing the agendas and
shaping the contexts in which actors contest
decisions and determine access to resources.
Governance attributes
The kinds of attributes we are initially interested in
are those frequently considered to be part of “good”
governance, e.g., participation, representation,
deliberation, accountability, empowerment, social
justice, and organizational features such as being
multilayered and polycentric (Fig. 1).
The amount of public participation by nonstate
actors in decision-exploring processes through to
implementation, monitoring, and sanctioning varies
from the provision of information by authorities to
various levels of consultation, collaboration, and
empowerment (IAP2 2004). Public participation
often broadens the range of interests and issues that
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Fig. 1. Associations between selected attributes of governance systems and the
capacity to manage resilience.
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need to be considered, because different
stakeholders assign different values to different
ecosystem services and risks. Deliberation is a
process of open communication, discussion, and
reflection among actors who have alternative
political viewpoints and understandings (Leeuwis
2000, Roling 2002). When it works well,
deliberation makes it possible to learn about the
views and motivations of others even when their
positions remain fixed (Schusler et al. 2003).
Deliberation can take place in many settings, both
formal and informal, including through networks
when people are more dispersed (Dryzek 1999).
Deliberative processes can help citizens and
scientists or experts better understand each other
(Backstrand 2003). Discursive legitimacy may even
be an important alternative or compliment to
representational democracy (Dryzek 1990, Dryzek
1999).
Polycentric institutions, by definition, have multiple
centers or authorities. This is thought to create
opportunities for understanding and for servicing
needs in spatially heterogeneous contexts (Imperial
1999, McGinnis 1999, Cash 2000). Typically, such
systems are also multilayered. A simple example is
federal systems. Polycentric, multilayered arrangements
do not have to be neatly hierarchical. Multilayered
institutional arrangements can be important for
handling scale-dependent governance challenges as
well as cross-scale interactions (Young 1994,
Berkes 2002, E. Ostrom and M. Janssen,
unpublished manuscript). Multilayered governance
creates possibilities for moderating vertical
interplay among institutions (Berkes 2002, Young
2002, Lebel 2005). The conventional criticism of
polycentric and multilayered arrangements is that
there is inefficient overlapping of co-ordination and
administrative responsibilities.
By accountability, we mean whether authorities are
obliged to provide information and explain
decisions and actions or inactions and whether they
can be sanctioned when those answers are
unsatisfactory (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Although
local authorities are often accountable upward to the
central authorities of the state, accountability
downward is often weak in natural resources
management (Ribot 2002). Accountability also
applies to more horizontal relationships, for
example, between expert advisory or consultant
bodies and state resource management agencies
(Cash et al. 2003). There are many mechanisms that
can contribute to accountability, including
transparency, independent monitoring, polycentricity,
separation of powers, legal recourse, budget control,
and a free media (Ribot 2002). Social justice is the
central goal of good governance. Unjust distribution
of benefits and involuntary risks from environmental
changes usually requires proactive efforts to address
inequities (Low and Gleeson 1998, Forsyth 2003).
Injustices arise from repressive social control and,
more subtly, from structural inequalities of power
and life circumstances (Swyngedouw and Heynen
2003, Barry 2005).
Capacity to manage resilience
A society’s ability to manage resilience resides in
actors, social networks, and institutions. The
condition and properties of the ecosystems that
people use can make management an easy or a hard
task. As a first step, it is helpful to break down this
ability into capacities for self-organization,
adaptation, and learning (Fig. 1). A capacity for self-
organization means that a system has ways to
maintain and re-create its identity. Although most
systems are linked to, and impacted by, other
systems, self-organizing systems are able to buffer
the impacts of other systems and do not need to be
continually invested in, subsidized, or replenished
from outside to persist (Ostrom 1999, Carpenter et
al. 2001, Holling 2001). The ability to learn and
adapt implies that a system can get better at pursuing
a particular set of management objectives over time
and at tackling new objectives when the context
changes (Adger et al. 2005, Brooks et al. 2005, Folke
et al. 2005). This ability may be further broken down
(Fig. 1).
The capacity to cope with nonlinearities or other
forms of surprise and uncertainty requires an
openness to learning, an acceptance of the
inevitability of change, and the ability to treat
interventions as experiments or adaptive management
(Gunderson 1999, Adger 2000, Pahl-Wostl and
Hare 2004, Adger and Vincent 2005). The capacity
to effectively combine or integrate understanding
gained from different sources and forms of
knowledge, including tacit and formal knowledge,
increases the likelihood that the key thresholds and
components of diversity will be acknowledged
(Berkes and Folke 1998, Berkes 1999). The ability
to detect hard-to-reverse thresholds in a timely
matter is important because it could allow societies
to take measures to prevent ecosystems from
crossing thresholds and ending up in another
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undesirable basin of attraction (Holling 1978,
Carpenter et al. 2001, Scheffer and Carpenter 2003).
The capacity to build and maintain social and
ecological diversity is important as a source of
renewal and reorganization following major crises
(Peterson 2000, Ostrom 2005). The capacity to build
knowledge about ecological processes into
institutions should improve the fit between rules and
ecosystems even as they go through dynamic cycles
(Holling 1986, Walters 1986, Berkes 1999,
Gunderson 2000, Young 2002, Folke et al. 2003).
The ability to engage effectively at multiple scales
is crucial for regional systems because they are
invariably subject to powerful external influences,
including changes in regulations, investments, and
the environment (Berkes 2002, Young 2002).
Association between governance and the ability
to manage resilience
This paper explores the association between
attributes of governance and the ability to manage
resilience in a set of case studies undertaken by the
Resilience Alliance (Table 1). The cases are diverse,
covering situations in both developed and
developing countries and involving marine,
wetland, urban, and forested ecosystems. An
outcome of the early rounds of exploration of the
case studies was an initial list of questions about the
relationships between governance and the ability to
manage resilience in terms of (1) participation and
deliberation, (2) polycentricism and multilayeredness,
and (3) accountability and social justice. Most of
the studies represented nuanced or more specific
variants of Proposition 8 in the overview paper of
this special issue, which states that adaptability is
primarily determined by (1) the absolute and
relative forms of social, human, natural,
manufactured, and financial capital and (2) the
system of institutions and governance. Over time,
this list of questions was refined to three
propositions related to attributes of governance and
the capacity to manage resilience. The rest of this
paper is organized around a discussion of these three
propositions. Each section has the same structure.
First, we introduce the proposition and explain the
reasoning behind it. We then explore three or four
case studies in modest depth. We end with
comparative observations drawing on additional
cases when appropriate and identifying other critical
issues.
PARTICIPATION AND DELIBERATION
The first proposition we examine is: Participation
builds the trust, and deliberation the shared
understanding, needed to mobilize and self-
organize.
Our argument is as follows. Public participation
allows differences in interests and interactions with
other issues to be brought forward for public
scrutiny. Deliberation allows the differences in
interests, perceptions, and explanations to be
explored without forcing consensus. Trust and
shared understanding are built up through repeated
interactions of stakeholders and enable social
learning (T. K. Ahn, unpublished manuscript; T. K.
Ahn and E. Ostrom, unpublished manuscript).
These form the foundation for mobilizing around
new issues such as looming thresholds and self-
organizing around innovative solutions or after
crises.
Great Barrier Reef, Australia
Consultation by the authorities to gain public
acceptance of unfamiliar management measures
and the need for action to support resilience have
been an important part of the management of the
Great Barrier Reef of Australia. Until relatively
recently, public perception of the Great Barrier Reef
was of a system that is vast, pristine, and robust.
Research, monitoring, and assessments suggest
otherwise. The reef has experienced serial depletion
of stocks over the past 150 yr as a result of industrial-
scale fishing for pearl oyster shell, sea cucumbers,
sharks, turtles, dugongs, and whales. Nutrient runoff
from land has increased fourfold compared to
precolonial times because of changes in agricultural
practices. Population explosions of crown-of-thorns
starfish have reduced coral cover, which has
declined by 50% over the past 40 yr. Bleaching and
mortality events caused by global warming are
increasing in frequency and scale. The Great Barrier
Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) is the
consultative multistakeholder body that manages
what is the largest marine protected area in the
world. In 2002, it initiated an ambitious consultancy
and public participation exercise to assist with plans
for enhancing the level of protection of reef
resources. There was immense public interest and
involvement. More than 31,000 written submissions
were received by the GBRMPA in response to 360
meetings and 88 newspaper advertisements. The
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Table 1. A concise summary of the main case studies referred to in this paper.
Goods and services of interest
Geographic location
Forest Wetlands Tourism Agricult-
ure
Fisheries Urban
Everglades wetlands, Florida, USA X X X X
Goulburn-Broken Catchment, Australia X
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, Australia X X
Gulf of Maine groundfishery, USA X
Kristianstad water realm, Sweden X X X
Northern Highlands Lake District, Wisconsin, USA X X X X
Mae Nam Ping Basin, Chiang Mai, Thailand X X X X
Malinau District, East Kalimantan, Indonesia X X
Chisasibi Cree areas, James Bay, Quebec, Canada X X
Institutional focus
Geographic location
Minority
rights
Vertical in-
terplay
Science-
policy bo-
undary
User asso-
ciations
Regional
organization
Everglades wetlands, Florida, USA X X X
Goulburn-Broken catchment, Australia X X
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, Australia X X X
Gulf of Maine groundfishery, USA X X X
Kristianstad water realm, Sweden X X
Northern Highlands Lake District, Wisconsin, USA X X
Mae Nam Ping Basin, Chiang Mai, Thailand X X X X
Malinau District, East Kalimantan, Indonesia X X X
Chisasibi Cree areas, James Bay, Quebec, Canada X X X
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resultant rezoning of the marine park increased the
area of no-take reserves from < 5 to 33% from July
2004 (Jago et al. 2004). Strong support for rezoning
came from all political parties, the tourism industry,
conservation groups, and scientists, with significant
opposition from local recreational and commercial
fishers. To satisfy the latter, the GBRMPA changed
the location of the boundaries drawn on a draft plan,
and the federal government compensated
commercial fishers who lost income. The new
zoning plan incorporates an improved system for
managing the sustainable use of the marine park by
indigenous communities based on consultative
Traditional Use of Marine Resources Agreements
(GBRMPA 2004). As a result of improved
awareness, fishers are increasingly willing to
support no-take reserved areas for the sake of
improved resilience and the long-term sustainability
of fish stocks. The rezoning would not have been
possible without public consultation.
Kristianstad Vattenrike, Sweden
In our next example, a trusted public authority was
the outcome rather than the driver of public
participation and deliberation. The Kristianstad
Water Realm in Sweden was set aside as a reserve
in the early 1970s. The wetlands, long viewed as
worthless swamps, are interspersed within and
around human settlements in a town with 70,000
inhabitants (Magnusson 2004). Management
initially struggled to halt the degradation of the land
and waterscapes in the reserve. It took 10–20 yr to
build trust and create a shared vision and sense of
stewardship with regard to the landscape
(Magnusson 2004, Olsson et al. 2004). A culture of
public involvement through issue-based actor
networks that form and disband as issues wax and
wane has been instrumental in maintaining high
responsiveness and flexibility when faced with
ecological uncertainties and changes (Olsson et al.
2004). This capacity has been strengthened by the
bottom-up emergence of a municipal-level
boundary organization, the Ecomuseum Kristianstads
Vattenrike. Sven-Erik Magnusson (SEM) played a
pivotal role first as a founder and later as Director
of the Ecomuseum. Olsson and colleagues (2004)
describe how SEM started as an assistant and then
became curator of the Kristianstad County Museum,
organizing natural history and cultural exhibitions.
SEM started the idea of “outdoor museums” by
introducing information panels in the landscape at
natural and archaeological sites. This in turn led to
an awareness of the eroding ecological values of the
wetland and associated cultural practices such as
grazing and haymaking. A series of assessment and
restoration activities followed, bringing together
new groups and increasing knowledge about local
environments (Magnusson 2004). When he
established the Ecomuseum, SEM focused on
building relationships with key individuals, for
example, at universities, the Worldwide Fund for
Nature, and the Tourism Board. Over time, the
effective mandate of the organization expanded into
managing the catchment of the lower Helgeå River
(Folke 2003) and shifted from being part of the
County Museum to becoming a part of the municipal
organization (Olsson et al. 2004).
Goulburn-Broken Catchment, Australia
The Goulburn-Broken Catchment in Australia is
beset by multiple water and soil problems as a result
of a long history of clearing native vegetation
(Binning et al. 2001, Cork et al. 2002). State-
sponsored participation has been a key strategy for
addressing problems related to soil conservation and
dryland salinity. The National Landcare Program
launched in 1989 is particularly noteworthy because
it is voluntary, participatory, and based on
education; these attributes have contributed to the
creation of a stewardship ethic (Curtis and
Lockwood 2000). Ideas of empowerment and
participation were central to the program, perhaps
so much so that resources were spread too thinly to
deal with more degraded locations (Pannell 2002).
In the last few years, Bill O’Kane, the Chief
Executive Officer of the Goulburn-Broken
Catchment Management Authority, has forged
strong links with the scientific and agricultural
business communities and media through active
participation on numerous boards and committees
and in ad hoc meetings. These networks have
brought information and resources to the catchment
and are helping managers plan and begin to address
the fundamental ecological and social challenges
facing the basin (CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems
2003). In many ways, the region remains culturally
trapped in a domain of attraction governed by a
relatively narrow set of rural-oriented values about
what rural landscapes should look like and what
livelihoods they should support. Nevertheless, the
efforts of the Catchment Management Authority
and its partners have undoubtedly strengthened the
capacity of the society in the basin to manage
resilience (CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems 2003).
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The Everglades, Florida, USA
Since the 1940s, the northern third of the Everglades
in Florida, USA, has been transformed into
agricultural land, whereas other parts are devoted
to urban and conservation land uses (Walker and
Solecki 2004). The result of this diversity has been
altered flood regimes and a series of ecological
surprises and associated policy and management
crises (Gunderson 1999). A vegetation shift from
sawgrass to cattail marshes, for example, was
caused by agricultural runoff after major
disturbances such as drought, freezes, and fires. The
1970 drought, for example, led to the creation of a
new institution, the South Florida Water
Management District, as a way to ensure that a
minimum water allocation was delivered to the
National Park regardless of rainfall. Deliberation,
especially among experts and mangers, was an
important feature in the 1980s and 1990s and helped
to shape alternative visions for the future of the
Everglades in Florida. An intense period of
consultation workshops primarily among biologists
and hydrologists led to new levels of system
understanding (Light et al. 1995). The mass media
has played an important role in transforming
relatively localized flood, drought, or algal bloom
events into Everglade-wide issues of importance,
effectively forcing a response from higher-level
authorities. Pictures of the Lake Okeechobee
blooms, for example, started a process that
challenged the effectiveness of the water
management authority and culminated in a lawsuit.
In 1988, a federal suit against the State of Florida
and the South Florida Water Management District
for failing to stop the flow of eutrophic water into
the Everglades National Park gave renewed impetus
to various groups seeking to restore the Everglades.
Iterative model development (Walters et al. 1992)
and scenario assessments (Ogden et al. 1999) in the
following years played an important role in the
search for and exploration of policy options, and
highlighted the importance of focusing on
hydrological manipulations in restoration. Gunderson
(1999) describes how the group attempted to
communicate its assessment through an animation
of the water system, a set of one-page fact sheets,
and meetings of the South Florida Water
Management District with a broader stakeholder
group. These actions lead to recommendations for
adaptive policies, but no real experimentation with
management. Gunderson attributes this failing both
to a lack of flexibility in the management
bureaucracy and the easy recourse to lawsuits by
stakeholders who might be adversely affected by
alternative management interventions. After many
years of apparent gridlock during which the costs
of restoration have risen tremendously, a significant
restoration effort is finally under way. The Army
Corps of Engineers is blocking canals, reconverting
agricultural lands to wetlands, and, in the process,
reversing decades of “land reclamation” logic
(Walker and Solecki 2004). Partnerships among
NGOs and state agencies committed to the
restoration of the Everglades maintain pressure for
these measures to be pursued in what is still a
polarized situation.
Several insights came from consideration of the role
of participatory and deliberative processes in
building the capacity to manage resilience across
these four regional case studies. First, the process
of trust-building takes time, at least one decade and
sometimes several. In some cases, it may be too slow
to avoid hard or costly-to-reverse thresholds. The
capacity to build networks of trust appears to be
fundamental to the kinds of self-organizing
collective action needed to manage resilience.
Second, leadership is important in fostering
effective public participation and deliberation. In
both the Goulburn-Broken Catchment and the
Kristianstad Water Realm, leaders helped their
organizations reach across institutional, scale, and
other barriers to create links that bring along with
them new ideas, skills, and resources. They gave
direction, and inspired and motivated others into
actions in which significant uncertainty could have
led to costly inaction. Third, and more critically, the
discourse of managing resilience or vulnerability is
subject to its own peculiar forms of politics rooted
in relatively narrow ecological reasoning that has
impacts on who participates and how. Aboriginal
interests, for example, have largely been sidelined
in deliberations about land use in the Goulburn-
Broken Catchment, whereas they have been much
better represented in deliberations over sea use in
the Great Barrier Reef. Finally, we note that
withholding participation in a process in which your
interests cannot be adequately represented may
sometimes be a good strategy (Dryzek 2001).
POLYCENTRIC AND MULTILAYERED
INSTITUTIONS
The second proposition we examine is: Polycentric
and multilayered institutions improve the fit
between knowledge, action, and socio-ecological
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contexts in ways that allow societies to respond
more adaptively at appropriate levels.
Our argument is as follows. An organizational
structure with multiple, relatively independent
centers creates opportunities for locally appropriate
institutions to evolve by tightening monitoring and
feedback loops and by enhancing associated
institutional incentives (Berkes and Folke 1998). In
this situation, local governance arrangements can
develop to better match the varied social and
ecological contexts and dynamics of different
locations. Local monitoring may provide effective
early warning systems, and monitoring of
interventions allows safe-to-fail experimentation.
Local knowledge can inform local actions in ways
that a single centralized system cannot.
Multilayered institutions, in addition, allow the
possibility for level-dependent management
interventions as well as explicit mechanisms to
address cross-level interactions (D. Cash, W. N.
Adger, F. Berkes, P. Garden, L. Lebel, P. Olsson,
L. Pritchard, and O. R. Young, unpublished
manuscript) without undermining the capacity to
self-organize at any particular level.
Chisasibi First Nation of Cree, Quebec,
Canada
The Chisasibi First Nation of Cree live in the James
Bay area of Quebec, Canada, close to the northern
limit of the Coniferous Forest Biome (Berkes 1998).
Up until the 1960s or so, they followed a traditional
migratory way of life. Although most of them now
live in a permanent year-round settlement, activities
related to hunting and fishing are still a central
component of the regional economy (Berkes 1999).
The hunting stewards of the Chisasibi Cree manage
caribou, beaver, and fish in ways that reflect
differences in resource dynamics (Berkes 1998).
Caribou are hunted on overlapping communal
territories, whereas beaver are managed at the level
of the family. Access to fish, which are abundant
relative to needs, is usually not controlled. Rules
and enforcement are decided collectively by the
stewards, who provide a second governance layer
above the community in the form of the Chisasibi
Cree Trappers Association. Stewards are
accountable for their performance. Berkes (1998),
for example, relates the story of how, after the return
of the caribou after an absence of 70 yr, a particularly
wasteful hunt was followed by the disappearance of
most of the herd the following year. Elders
explained that this was because of a lack of respect
and related how this had happened before, in 1910
when automatic rifles were first introduced, and had
been followed by a 70-yr “retaliatory” absence. The
impact on young hunters was profound. The
Chisasibi Cree Trappers Association took control
of the hunt, as was their people’s right under the
James Bay Agreement with the Canadian
government. In subsequent years, caribou numbers
continued to increase, reinforcing the oral history
lessons (Berkes 1999). Traditional management is
polycentric, multilayered, and adaptive. It changed
in response to natural resource dynamics and over
time with development, made errors in
management, and learned from those mistakes.
Mae Nam Ping Basin, Thailand
In the main valley of the Mae Nam Ping Basin
around Chiang Mai and Lamphun towns in northern
Thailand, a surprisingly high level of flexibility in
water management has emerged from the interplay
of many local and a few higher-level institutions.
Over the past two to three decades, the density of
institutions has increased, and the management
challenges have grown tougher for two main
reasons. First, several state projects have
substantially expanded dry-season cropping areas
both in the basin and much further downstream
toward Bangkok (Molle et al. 2001). Second, urban
expansion, tourism, and the growth of the industrial
sector have resulted in major shifts in land use and
in patterns of demand for water in a monsoonal
system with very modest dry-season storage
capacity (Cohen and Pearson 1998, Lebel et al.
2004). At the same time, decentralization reforms
have assigned significant responsibilities for
managing smaller-scale water infrastructure to local
government administrations with jurisdictional
boundaries that often do not correspond closely with
those of either irrigation districts, municipalities, or
traditional Muang Fai, i.e., local weir-based
irrigation and water sharing, institutions (Pearson
1999). Additional layers in the form of a River Basin
Organization and initially three pilot sub-basin river
organizations have also been introduced (Thomas
2005). What is remarkable is that each of these new
institutional arrangements has been added on top of
older arrangements without necessarily replacing
them. This polycentric and multilayered arrangement
creates institutional redundancies, but field-level
work suggests that water is still distributed
reasonably equitably and flexibly within the
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constraints of operational guidelines that ensure that
urban areas are serviced first. The heads of water
user groups call their friends in the irrigation
department and have their allocations increased at
critical times. Water pumps and wells that are
technically illegal are overlooked. Informal, or
shadow, institutions help maintain system integrity
through dry-season scarcity. The current approach
of allowing creative and different solutions in each
of the sub-basin organizations (Thomas 2005)
should help build additional capacity to manage
water resources in locally appropriate ways.
New England fishery, USA
In the New England fishery, there has also been a
historical evolution toward additional layers, but
they have generally reproduced the management of
past regimes rather than learning from the new
opportunities created at other scales. Thus, when the
International Commission of Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries divided its huge jurisdiction into several
fishing grounds such as the Gulf of Maine, it
continued to focus management on individual
commercial species and stock management
approaches (Wilson 2002). The groundfishery in the
Gulf of Maine has been managed at a relatively
broad scale under the assumption that the fish of
each species within the managed area comprise a
single, spatially distinct stock that is homogeneously
distributed within the management area (Costanza
et al. 1998, Wilson et al. 1999, Steelman and
Wallace 2001). For all practical purposes, the types
of complex population structures that might arise
from the localized ecological adaptations of fish, for
example, local spawning groups, nursery areas, and
so on, are ignored or assumed to average out over
the management area. However, there is
increasingly strong evidence that the population
structure of many groundfish species, in the Gulf of
Maine and elsewhere, is quite complex (e.g.,
Robichaud and Rose 2004). This has created a
variety of regulatory incentives that confound the
goal of conservation (Wilson 2002).
At a broad scale, management has worked out
reasonable estimates of the number of fish of each
species that exist in the area and from that, and a
large number of assumptions, an estimate of how
many individuals of each species can be caught, on
average, to maintain the population. These estimates
are then used to determine the limits on fishing
effort. The problem is that fishermen do not fish on
the average spatial distribution of fish. Good
fishermen fish where the fish are; they exploit their
knowledge of the local adaptations of fish (St.
Martin 2001). This would not be a problem if fish
conformed to the assumptions of spatial
homogeneity; the patches fishermen work would be
simply ephemeral expressions of a single large
stock. However, if fish really do adapt to the local
variations in their environment, then fishing effort
will converge on the more abundant local
populations. Consequently, the result of the
mismatch between scientists’ perception of a broad
homogeneous environment and fishermen’s usually
correct perception of a diverse, multiscale
environment, is an inadvertent continuation of
uncontrolled fishing for each localized stock, even
with seemingly strict, broad-scale limits on fishing.
Moreover, fishermen, like fish, are diverse and
operate on many scales. Some operate locally in
very small boats, others steam a little further in
somewhat larger boats, others leave home for weeks
at a time, and still others range over the globe. Some,
usually small-scale fishermen, fish on many species
with many kinds of gear, whereas others, generally
larger-scale fishers, fish on a few or only one species
with a single kind of gear. With the progressive loss
of local stocks and the increasing spatial variability
of fish abundance, a growing economic premium
attaches to size and mobility. To chase down scarce,
patchily distributed stocks, a boat must be fast, able
to carry a lot of fish, able to stay at sea for extended
periods, specialized and technologically up to date,
and strongly attached to high-volume, usually urban
product markets. These industrial-scale operators,
who also have easy access to capital, out-compete
smaller-scale local fishers with impacts that cascade
through the local economies based on services to
fishers and the marketing of fish.
The groundfishery in the Gulf of Maine has
collapsed, from both social and ecological
perspectives, into a highly resilient but relatively
undesirable configuration for many stakeholders.
Although groundfish populations and landings have
plummeted in the last 20 yr, other species further
down the food chain, such as lobster, have become
almost hyperabundant (Wilson 2002). Almost
everything in these fishing communities today
depends on lobster. The great fear is that the
condition of the ecosystem may degrade further
with disastrous social consequences. Any
movement toward an alternative resilient system
will require a governance system and a scientific
approach that recognize the diversity and multiscale
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attributes of the ocean and of fishing. Area-based
management might be an effective alternative to
management by numbers. Such a decentralized
approach would allow appropriate feedback on the
behavior of fishers. The mobility of fish and fishers
is one of the reasons why polycentric and
multilayered approaches may enhance capacities
for collective learning (Wilson 2002).
Northern Highlands Lake District, Wisconsin,
USA
In Wisconsin's Northern Higlands Lake District,
excess phosphorus from intensive applications of
fertilizer on agricultural lands and from feeds
accumulates in soils. During runoff events, it enters
lakes that can then switch from clear to turbid and
eutrophic (Bennett et al. 1998, Carpenter et al.
1999). This impacts on recreation, kills fish, and is
costly to treat. Although both lake states can be
resilient, in practice it is hard to successfully restore
lakes once they have collapsed into the turbid state
(Lanthrop et al. 1998, Carpenter et al. 2001).
Polycentrically arranged lake associations, tribal
organizations, and town governments have been an
important source of management actions.
Modelling and scenario exercises incorporating
alternative stable states and complex dynamics from
trophic cascades and mobile fishers support the idea
of managing the landscape as a set of lakes (Janssen
2001, Peterson et al. 2003). Flexible lake-specific
management appears more likely to lead to resilient
outcomes in terms of maintaining revenue generated
from fisheries without triggering collapse from
overfishing than do attempts to harmonize
management across all lakes (Carpenter and Brock
2004). The existing social organization of towns,
lake associations, and tribal institutions is
conducive to a polycentric arrangement, with higher
layers providing key coordination functions.
In all four regional case studies, polycentric and
multilayered institutions appear to be important to
building or enabling the capacity to manage
resilience. We highlight three issues worthy of
additional exploration. First, users dependent on a
heterogeneous resource who have a large stake in it
being managed sustainably can come up with
institutional arrangements that reflect key
properties of the resource (cf. Jodha 2001). The
groundfish example, however, underlines how
contested knowledge can make it hard to bring about
institutional change even after a crisis and
prolonged collapse. How do polycentric and
multilayered institutions that support the capacity
to manage resilience arise in the first place? Second,
although much has been learned about the
monitoring and transaction costs of more complex
institutional arrangements (e.g., Ostrom 1999), it is
far from clear how these considerations can and
should be balanced against concerns about
sustainability and social justice. How much does it
cost to build the capacity to manage resilience, and
when is it simply not worth it? Third, all four studies
suggest that interest-based networks are flexible and
can learn quickly (Folke 2003). This should be
particularly valuable in situations of high
uncertainty. At the same time, the earlier examples
in Kristianstad, the Goulburn-Broken Catchment,
and Mae Nam Ping underline the value of
institutionalization. What are the trade-offs between
the flexibility of actor networks and more formally
institutionalized relationships in strengthening the
capacity to manage resilience?
ACCOUNTABLE AND JUST AUTHORITIES
The third proposition we examine is: Accountable
authorities who also pursue just distributions of
benefits and involuntary risks enhance the adaptive
capacity of vulnerable groups and society as a
whole.
Our argument is as follows. Authorities who are
obliged to explain and inform, and who can be
sanctioned when they perform poorly, can be
challenged by groups that unjustly bear large
involuntary risks or receive less than their fair share
of benefits. The pursuit of social justice by actively
protecting the rights and interests of or empowering
socially vulnerable groups is a worthy one without
additional justification. At the same time, however,
socially vulnerable groups are often dependent on,
and contribute to the maintenance of, aspects of
ecological and social diversity overlooked or
undervalued by the mainstream or dominant culture.
Often, efforts to improve the just distribution of
benefits and involuntary risks from the management
of ecosystems and their services also help to
maintain diversity and enhance the adaptive
capacity of these vulnerable groups. These
enhancements, in turn, help reduce the vulnerability
of the social-ecological system as a whole by
reducing destabilizing conflicts and strengthening
weak links.
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Malinau District, East Kalimantan, Indonesia
Malinau District in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, was
established in 1999 as part of the national
decentralization process in Indonesia (e.g., Silver
2003, Thorburn 2004). The district has significant
forest resources and logging activity, with 95% of
the land area classified as Forest Estate (Barr et al.
2001). This activity yields high resource rents, but
the local people receive very few benefits. There are
three major stakeholder groups: (1) forest-based
indigenous Punan hunter-gatherers and Dayak
shifting cultivators, (2) town-based workers and
traders who have moved to the area because of its
economic opportunities, and (3) the forestry and
mining industries, which are externally controlled
but locally well connected (Sayer and Campbell
2004). In Malinau, the management of the timber
concession was decentralized from the central
government to the provinces and districts without
any mechanisms to support accountability
(Wollenberg and Kartodihardjo 2002). Prior to
decentralization, the local people received almost
no benefits from logging, but now logging
companies are making some attempt to compensate
the local people. The amounts involved are small,
and promises made about payments or services to
be provided are seldom kept. Customary land tenure
and associated property rights are frequently
contested by different groups and villages. Many of
the permits for small-scale forest conversion have
gone to larger Malaysian-backed logging
companies, which has created opportunities for
quick profits from timber exploitation for the district
government, forest authorities, and timber brokers
(Barr et al. 2001). There has been little monitoring
or control of what is actually cut or the impacts of
logging on the local ecosystem. The practices of
forestry companies granted access by the district
appear to be even less environmentally sustainable
than those permitted by the previous regime, at least
in Malinau.
Governance arrangements are important in at least
two ways. First, district officials are elected, largely
from local groups, and remain relatively sensitive
to the needs and expectations of their constituencies.
However, once elected they move to town, which
distances them both physically and socially from
their communities of origin. Second, the rents
generated by resource access deals are shared
between the forestry companies, the district
government, district officials as a private benefit,
and local communities in the form of services and
infrastructure with the occasional cash payment.
Although ethnic, economic, and family ties are all
important, benefits are often not distributed beyond
the key individuals in a village (Barr et al. 2001).
Democratic institutions that could foster dual
accountability between village, district, and
provincial authorities are lacking. In the absence of
direct elections, deliberative public meetings, and
an independent press, the accountability of state
officials remains low (Barr et al. 2001). Even
traditional Adat institutions have lost credibility
because they are strategically and blatantly used to
gain access to concessions. Finally, monitoring and
enforcement of good logging practices are weak
(Smith et al. 2003).
A number of research teams have focused on the
most marginalized communities with the explicit
objective of empowering the local people so that
they can better negotiate with district officials and
logging companies. This fostered conflict with the
other stakeholders and the research teams associated
with them. For example, those researchers
interacting with district officials often received
complaints about the type of community research
being conducted. Several slower, potentially
destabilizing feedback loops were also identified.
Logging imposes a range of environmental damages
and social costs, including reduced water quality,
declines in fish and fish catch, and a reduction in
nontimber products for consumption and local
trade. Existing governance structures do not
generally provide mechanisms for managing these
impacts. Several local villages object to or prevent
logging in their areas. The majority support forestry
but seek greater local benefits. One village is
opposed to logging in principle and has developed
the basis for a local eco-tourism “industry.” This
village was supported by the research team to the
extent that it received a national environmental
award, the granting of which raised its standing in
the district and probably gave the villagers better
negotiating power with other powerful players in
the district.
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
In the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, progress
toward protecting the rights of the indigenous
people has also been made. The park stops short of
the Torres Straits, between Australia and Papua
New Guinea, where the Torres Strait Treaty
recognizes the indigenous rights of the traditional
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inhabitants (Elmer and Coles 1991). The original
act that established the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park Authority (GBRMPA) in 1975 made no
specific references to indigenous interests, and it
was not until zoning plans were drafted in 1983 that
reports on indigenous issues began to be
commissioned by GBRMPA (Benzaken et al.
2002). The Mabo court case in 1992 overturned the
concept of terra nullius, which stated that Australia
was not owned prior to the arrival of Europeans, and
instead established the concept of “native title.” This
decision has heightened expectations for greater
involvement by traditional owners in the
management of the marine park and their “sea
country.” However, customary marine tenure is
often difficult to establish, and because it is highly
communal and flexible, it is also difficult to legislate
using established institutions and western laws.
GBRMPA held more than 50 workshops for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in
2002–2004 as part of its public consultation on
rezoning the Barrier Reef. Today many indigenous
groups actively seek involvement in the
management of the park, although roles beyond
employment as community rangers remain limited
and uncertain, especially with the major expansion
of no-take areas. Hunting for dugongs and sea
turtles, highly valued traditional foods, is an on-
going cultural practice of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples living adjacent to the Great
Barrier Reef. Nonindigenous users of the marine
park are not permitted to take these species, which
Australia is obliged to protect under various national
laws and international conventions. Unfortunately,
populations of dugongs and turtles are in sharp
decline. Consequently, traditional hunting generates
a media controversy that creates pressure to curtail
the harvesting of threatened species (Nursey-Bray
2003). Some innovative co-management systems
are being developed to allow limited traditional
hunting of a dwindling resource. Traditional
activities that are forbidden to nontraditional users
require a permit or an accredited Traditional Use of
Marine Resource Agreement that is designed to “...
put in place a range of management procedures that
encompasses Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
cultural values, conservation biodiversity interests
and current native title law ...” (GBRMPA 2004).
Local government reforms, capacity building
within the bureaucracy, and pressure from an
increasingly active citizenry have helped to improve
the quality of many aspects of governance in Thai
society over the past decade (Arghiros 2002). The
performance of most authorities is now open to
public scrutiny, and the press remains relatively
free. Nevertheless, a lot still depends on who you
are. For ethnic minorities without citizenship status,
and even for those who do have it, discrimination
makes life difficult and dangerous. Low-quality
information on ecological trends, language and
other communication difficulties, insecurity, and
the threat of violence perpetuate social injustices.
Myths about the impacts and performance of upland
land-use practices abound (Forsyth 1996, 1998,
Walker 2003). Especially in border areas,
authorities with low accountability have kept
information secret so that, for example, their
complicity in illegal or unregulated extraction of a
natural resource may continue, or their history of
poor management decisions can be covered up. In
these contexts, resistance, protest, and other means
of dissent may be an important precursor to gaining
access to platforms for participation and
deliberation that otherwise would not be provided
willingly. A substantial amount of effort by
nongovernmental agencies has gone into
empowering minorities, drawing attention to their
plight, and critiquing authorities for their failure to
deliver services and support (Luangaramsri 1999,
Santasombat 2004). This is important because many
households and often entire communities are
extremely vulnerable to changes, for example, in
access to forest and agricultural lands in the
mountains or in employment opportunities in the
lowlands. Climate variability is also a source of
vulnerability for their rain-fed agriculture, but
traditional swidden systems, portfolio-based
livelihood strategies, and spatially extensive kin
networks that act as social safety nets mean that
livelihoods may still be surprisingly resilient well
below the poverty line (Lebel 2003, Garden et al.
2005). Institutional arrangements that foster dual
accountability among local government and
nongovernmental organizations and help coordinate
their activities appear to be particularly promising
for upper-tributary watershed areas (Thomas et al.
2004, Thomas 2005).
Accountability is usually thought of as one
supporting mechanism to achieve the goal of social
justice in development and environmental
management. Our exploration of regional case
studies in this and earlier sections raises four issues
(Table 2). First, decentralization without corresponding
accountability may reduce the capacity to manage
resilience. At all scales, the activities and
performance of authorities need to be monitored,
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and there should be mechanisms to sanction or
remove corrupt or incompetent players. The upward
and downward accountability of authorities is a
safeguard that prevents the “capture” of the agenda
and resources and provides ways to reorganize after
failures. Second, accountability appears to enhance
the ability of authorities to work at multiple scales
and thus to benefit from and not be overwhelmed
by cross-scale interactions. This capacity may be
particularly important in slowing or avoiding crises
and in drawing on other resources for reorganization
in the ensuing politics of scale (e.g., Lebel et al.
2005). Third, protecting rights and pursing justice
for ethnic minorities are key actions in building the
capacity to manage resilience. In the Indonesian and
Thai case studies, insecure rights to farms and
forested lands, along with insecure citizenship and
the associated implications for credit and other
services, leaves ethnic minorities in a difficult
situation. Their livelihoods depend strongly on
goods such as timber and nontimber forest products
as well as indirectly on various soil and hydrological
services of watersheds, but these are insecure and
threatened by, in the Ping case, conservation and,
in Malinau, logging policies. The regaining of rights
to self-management for the Chisasibi Cree under the
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of
1975 (Berkes 1998) illustrates how protecting the
rights of socially vulnerable groups can help them
cope better with the types of changes caused by
hydroelectric power development projects and huge
fluctuations in caribou abundance. Finally, we note
that gender issues, surprisingly, went unreported in
the case studies. Is this an accurate reflection of the
equity in these regional systems, or does it reflect
on the politics of how resilience and vulnerability
are studied or managed?
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper explored how certain attributes of
governance function in society to enhance the
capacity to manage resilience. We approached this
by reviewing experiences in a set of regional case
studies carried out by the Resilience Alliance (Table
1) against a framework of attributes and capacities
(Fig. 1). Three specific propositions were examined:
(1) participation builds the trust, and deliberation
the shared understanding, needed to mobilize and
self-organize; (2) polycentric and multilayered
institutions improve the fit between knowledge,
action, and socio-ecological contexts in ways that
allow societies to respond more adaptively at
appropriate levels; and (3) accountable authorities
who also pursue just distributions of benefits and
involuntary risks enhance the adaptive capacity of
vulnerable groups and society as a whole.
Some support was found for parts of all three
propositions. In exploring, debating, and deciding
what to do, diverse participation, open
communication, and deliberation are important
because they help build the trust and shared
understanding among diverse stakeholders needed
to mobilize resources and people and to foster self-
organization. In monitoring, using, and managing
natural resource systems, the flexibility provided by
polycentric and multilayered systems of governance
can create opportunities for learning and decision
making in places and scales that match social and
ecological contexts much more closely than is
possible in monolithic arrangements. Accountable
authorities who also pursue social justice by helping
to secure the livelihoods of the most vulnerable
groups enhance the capacity of society to manage
resilience.
These findings are necessarily tentative. The
collection of case studies explored in this paper was
assembled post hoc, and the individual studies
themselves were not designed to address questions
about governance. Much of the variation in the
association between governance arrangements and
the capacity to manage resilience remains
unexplained.
Our exploration also raised several theoretical and
practical issues. First is the problem of
measurement. The capacities of individual actors or
institutionalized relationships among them are not
straightforward to assess. Although there are
methods available, most governance attributes have
not been systematically assessed in the same places
in which social-ecological relationships are studied.
Hence, our understanding of, for example, what
makes participation and deliberation effective
remains rudimentary (e.g., Rayner 2003, Rowe and
Frewer 2004). Second is the problem of experts.
Analysis of governance structures and processes
sometimes reveals the darker side of conservation
in which livelihood needs or the rights of minorities
are passed over in the interests of maintaining, say,
ecological resilience. Ultimately, these decisions
about how to deal with trade-offs and priorities
among social and environmental objectives are and
should be political, and should not be left to experts
and narrowly framed models (Goldman 2004).
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Table 2. Comparison of some key organizations and their institutional relationships in a selected set of
case studies.
Organization
(date established)
Mandate Upward accountability Downward accountability Key sources of expertise
Goulburn-Broken Catc-
hment Management
Authority (1997)
Natural resource
management
Board of Directors
appointed by Minister
for Environment and
Water in the Victoria
State Government
Through three
subcatchment committees,
each with eight
community representatives,
and indirectly through
stakeholder projects
CSIRO Sustainable
Ecosystems
Ecomuseum Kristianstads
Vattenrike (1989)
Environmental and
cultural aspects of
catchment management
Municipality of
Kristianstad
Issues networks and
co-management relatio-
nships with stakeholder
groups
Knowledgeable local
stewards and
associations
 Lund, Kristianstad, and
Stockholm Universities;
WWF Sweden; Museum
of National History
Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park Authority
(1975)
Management of the
park for multiple uses
Australian Government,
World Heritage
Commission
GBR Consultative
Committee,
 10 local marine
advisory committees,
 high public interest
Reef Cooperative
Research Centre, James
Cook University, the
Australian Institute of
Marine Science, the
University of
Queensland, and
Australian National
University
South Florida Water
Management District
(1972)
Operation of canals
and levees, restoration
of ecosystems, and
disaster management
Federal agencies,
 governing board,
 Florida legislature
Mass media, user
groups, and the public
monitor performance
closely
Many universities,
federal and state
agencies, consulting
firms, and NGOs
Chisabisi Cree
Trappers Associations
(1985)
Management of
caribou hunt
Governing board under
James Bay Agreement,
 elders
Hunters, caribou Traditional knowledge
of elders and younger
hunters
Assessments and other tools for managing the
science-policy interface can be particularly helpful
in these circumstances (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998,
Social Learning Group 2001). Third is the problem
of causality. Our explorations here indicate that it
is possible that the capacity to manage resilience
may influence the form that governance takes and
that ecological feedbacks may constrain both
governance and this capacity.
What is abundantly clear is that, in exploring the
sustainability of regional social-ecological systems,
we are usually faced with a set of ecosystem goods
and service that interact with a collection of users
who have different technologies, interests, and
levels of power. In this situation, in our roles as
analysts, facilitators, change agents, or stakeholders,
we must ask not only: the resilience of what, to
what? We must also ask: for whom?
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art19/responses/
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